The International Crisis Group has a helpful brief on Life Under Gang Rule in El Salvador that brings out many of the issues causing people from the Northern Triangle to flee the region. Gang violence is pervasive. Salvadorans avoid talking about gangs in public out of fear that the wrong people will overhear their conversations. Gangs control citizens' every move - where they can live, work, and socialize. And gang members are not just kid on the streets with tattoos.

Media reports about MS-13 and other maras depict the members bearing archetypal tattoos and speaking in trademark slang. Not all gang members are so easily identifiable. The gangs remain rooted in the streets but have now penetrated every layer of Salvadoran society. Gangs have mutated from youth groups defending neighbourhood turf in the 1980s to hierarchical organisations that coerce, threaten and kill. Many members and sympathisers, particularly from MS-13, become teachers, lawyers, local government officials and even police officers who serve the gang’s interests. Their influence has grown so great that every major political party in El Salvador and Honduras has at some point paid gangs during elections.

Unfortunately, especially for young me, many Salvadorans must fear the police as much as they do the maras.

The International Crisis Group has a helpful brief on Life Under Gang Rule in El Salvador that brings out many of the issues causing people from the Northern Triangle to flee the region. Gang violence is pervasive. Salvadorans avoid talking about gangs in public out of fear that the wrong people will overhear their conversations. Gangs control citizens' every move - where they can live, work, and socialize. And gang members are not just kid on the streets with tattoos.

Media reports about MS-13 and other maras depict the members bearing archetypal tattoos and speaking in trademark slang. Not all gang members are so easily identifiable. The gangs remain rooted in the streets but have now penetrated every layer of Salvadoran society. Gangs have mutated from youth groups defending neighbourhood turf in the 1980s to hierarchical organisations that coerce, threaten and kill. Many members and sympathisers, particularly from MS-13, become teachers, lawyers, local government officials and even police officers who serve the gang’s interests. Their influence has grown so great that every major political party in El Salvador and Honduras has at some point paid gangs during elections.

Unfortunately, especially for young me, many Salvadorans must fear the police as much as they do the maras.

“The question is more fundamental: What does our existence say about the government and the services it fails to provide? We exist because there is nothing else.”

Azam Ahmed has a report entitled ‘They Will Have to Answer to Us’ for the New York Times that provides an overview of gang politics in El Salvador. There's too much narrative and not enough evidence and analysis in the piece for my taste but it is still worth the read.

The article is told mostly through the eyes of Santiago, a 33-year-old member of the 18th Street Sureños (Southerners). Santiago has been around for awhile. He spoke with Danny Gold for Vice in 2016. He spoke with Anastasia Moloney for Reuters in 2015. Here he is with PBS in 2014.

Santiago often performed the role of  human rights lawyer for his gang and had been a member of the gangs' political commission. At this point, he seems to be disenchanted with everyone in El Salvador - the government, the gangs, the police. He's now left the country.

If we think that the elections in Honduras are a mess, Santiago gives us something to look forward to in El Salvador. With municipal and legislative elections scheduled for 2018 and presidential elections for 2019, Santigato says that his gang will no longer support the FMLN.

Well before the trial, Santiago wrote a manifesto for the gangs. For the first time in decades, they would not support the F.M.L.N. at the polls. They would instead use their political might to swing the elections away from them, whether to the right-wing party or, potentially, third-party candidates. The quid pro quo had always been support — in return for money — for the F.M.L.N. But President Sánchez Cerén of the F.M.L.N. had broken its longstanding relationship with the gangs by waging war against them. So the gangs would respond by wielding their 10 percent of the vote to punish them in the Legislature. The approaches from political parties had already started: politicians seeking access, favors, votes ahead of next year’s election. “We are the pretty girl that everyone wants to dance with right now,” Santiago told me.

I wanted some follow up on how the gangs had supported the FMLN for "decades." Given that gangs negotiated with both the FMLN and ARENA in 2014, it doesn't sound like their agreement had been that sincere. Why should we believe that the gangs control (only) ten percent of the vote? Since the release of video recording related to the 2014 negotiations between the major political parties and the gangs, have representatives from political parties continued to negotiate with the gangs?

Santiago left the country months ago and said that he has no plans to return to El Salvador for at least a year or so. How much should we weigh about his opinions about the upcoming elections?

InSight Crime's Tristan Clavel had an interesting interview with FIU's Jose Miguel Cruz a few weeks back about a recent study he had conducted on El Salvador's gangs. You should read the entire interview but here's an exchange from the end of the interview.

IC: Your report shows that overall, a large number of members want to leave the gang or calm down, but it is extremely hard to do so. What actions should the government, civil society, academics and experts thus take concerning gang member rehabilitation?

JMC: This is a tough question because there are no easy responses to the overall problem of gangs in El Salvador. The point is to create the conditions for those gang members who want to desist and rehabilitate so they can do it in a safe and sustainable way. That means first stopping the war and reducing the violence. Second, it's important to create justice mechanisms to deal with the conundrum of past criminal behavior. In other words, we need to face the fact that many gang members have committed crimes and the society needs to come to terms with how to deal with them in a way that will not ignore the victims, as hard as this may be. And third, it's important to provide life opportunities such as school, jobs and rehabilitation services for those who want to leave the gangs.

Everything in here is why I supported the 2012 gang truce. We had heard that many gang members no longer wanted to live the lives that they had chosen. Some knew what they were getting into when they joined the MS-13 and the 18th Street gangs, but many did not. They joined for family, for security, for a sense of belonging.

I still think that the goal should be to use the truce to get as many "kids" out of gangs as possible and to put in place smarter approaches to gang prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies. It isn't reasonable to expect all fifty thousand or so gang members to give up the gang life. (El Salvador: Historic gang truce brings mixed results, September 2012)

The truce provided an opportunity for the state to work with gang leaders to facilitate the exit of many members from their ranks. Unfortunately, the Salvadoran State and gang leaders, as well as the people of El Salvador and the international community, could not devise exit strategies, rehabilitation programs, job training initiatives, and actual jobs. They couldn't figure out how to address the fact that thousands of these individuals had committed heinous crimes.

Insight Crime has a terrific translation of a Spanish-language article written by Carlos Martínez and Roberto Valencia of El Faro about an offer by Salvadoran gangs to negotiate a new dialogue with the government.

The MS13 has called for negotiations with the government, which could include the dismantling of the gang, implying a drastic change in posture since four years ago when the gang's national leadership refused to enter a dialogue about its possible dissolution.

Three spokesmen for the MS13 revealed to El Faro a proposal to discuss solutions to the crisis of violence in a public negotiation with the government and all political parties. Eugenio Chicas, spokesman for the presidency, says it is a proposal that "must be considered."

The MS13 has put its dissolution on the table which seems to be a remarkable development. In 2012, dissolution was never on the table and those who did leave to pursue lives outside of gang life (bakeries and such) were never "out." You were allowed out as long as the gangs said so. I have no idea if this is going to go anywhere. My inclination is to say no. The failure to put together a comprehensive process in 2012 and 2013, and then the politics of the 2014 presidential election, left a lot of bad blood on all sides.

Eugenio Chicas lays out what might be needed for a successful dialogue, all of which are difficult to foresee in today's Salvadoran and regional environment.

 Chicas believes that the possibility of exploring an agreement with the MS13 depends on several factors: first, the social acceptance of the negotiations; second, the convergence of the political willingness of different parties; and third, the resources needed to finance such a process and the legal discussions that must take place before it starts.

"This is an issue that must be considered. Not only has El Salvador's society proved to be against any attempt at dialogue or conversation with the gangs, it also vehemently opposes any advantage or legal benefit for these groups. And a government must understand the will of its citizens. This is a key element, but it is not the only one. Another crucial factor will be the chances of a political agreement between different governing forces, in this case the country's government together with the opposition and other social actors, as reflected in the National Security Council. This is another factor that must be taken into account, and another element is whether the strategy could yield better results within the political time frame we have left. Bear in mind that elections will take place in the few years we've got left," he stated.

Understandably so, the Salvadoran people are against dialogue with the gangs. The FMLN and ARENA have found it difficult to work together and there are new laws in place (gangs as terrorists) that will make political action more difficult. The initial truce never had US support and lacked significant financial backing from the international community. I'm doubtful that these would be more forthcoming in 2017. The environment in 2012 presented a real opportunity for a serious reduction in violence. I'd like to think that such an environment could be re-created in 2017 but I am doubtful.