Category Archives: Gross Fixed Capital Formation

2/9/16: Investment in Italy: Banks, Capital and Firms Structures

In my course on the enterprise and financial risk last semester, we talked about the peculiar (or idiosyncratic) nature of Italian firms across a number of matters:

Relationship banking;
Firm governance: family ownership, equity distribution and aspects of firm strategy and operations;
Firm capital structure (leverage risks in particular);
Firm dividend policy choices, etc.

Now, let’s add to that literature something new. A recent paper from the Banca d’Italia, titled “Investment and investment financing in Italy: some evidence at the macro level” by Claire Giordano, Marco Marinucci and Andrea Silvestrini (Banca d’Italia Occasional paper Number 307 – February 2016) looks at the evolution of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession across the Italian economy in terms of credit fundamentals.

As noted by the authors, “following the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the euro area experienced a large fall in gross fixed capital formation, both in 2008-09 and during the sovereign debt crisis. This drop was dramatic in the countries more exposed to tensions in government bond markets. In Italy, in particular, total real investment has suffered a loss of around 30 per cent since 2007, the pre-crisis peak, reverting to its lowest levels since the mid-1990s. Weak investment also remained a key drag on GDP growth in 2014, although more recent quarterly data on capital accumulation point to a slight increase over the first three quarters of 2015 relative to the corresponding period in 2014.”

In a typical European fashion, investment in Italy must equal debt. In part, as I usually cover in my courses on risk and corporate financial strategies, this is tied to the reluctance of the family-owned firms to release equity. And in part, it is a part of a broader European debt disease. Independent of the reasons, per authors, the worthy corner to check for key investment-crises interlinkages is the credit supply.

“The depressed growth of investment is in contrast with the substantially muted aggregate financing costs, which stem from the low interest rate environment resulting from the strongly expansionary stance of monetary policy in the euro area. In this context, one scenario is that investment demand will remain too low to absorb financial savings, inducing a persistent state of an excess supply of funds in capital markets.” In other words, Italians are discovering secular stagnation: interest rates are too low because investment is too low (and may be, also the other way around).

With that in mind, the authors proceed to show that “medium-term gross fixed capital formation trends in Italy may be summarised along the following lines”:

Pre–2007 capital expansion “was broad-based, both across institutional sectors and asset categories, although less marked for households”, and Post-2007 “exceptional downturn …affected all sectors and components, yet to a different extent. In particular, focusing on the most recent period, the decline in general government and non-financial corporations’ expenditure, cumulatively undertaking about two thirds of total investment in Italy, was sizeable (approximately 25 per cent), yet slightly more contained than the concurrent drop in household investment spending.”

Overall, “the total-economy investment rate in Italy currently stands at its lowest levels since data became available in the mid-1990s; current government and non-financial corporation investment rates are comparable only to those recorded in 1995; the household rate is even lower. From the asset side, in recent years construction investment, in both residential dwellings and non-residential buildings, which represents half of total expenditure, was the hardest-hit item, excluding transport equipment expenditure (small and volatile), whereas ICT investment and the accumulation of intangible assets weathered the recent double-dip recession better.”

But the age of lower interest rates is having another impact on Italian credit markets. This impact is aggressive rolling over of maturing loans amidst deteriorating credit quality of borrowers. As the result, two things can be documented in Italian credit market experience since 2008 bust:

Firstly, overall, the trend toward longer debt maturity is present in household, corporate and government debt sectors (charts below). Secondly, this is doing nothing to repair credit quality on banks balance sheets.

Which is rocking, for now, as low interest rates are keeping debt burden down and allowing leverage to rise. But the problem is that with longer maturity of debt, we are looking at higher long term susceptibility to debt servicing costs. Last time that happened, Italy became on of the PIIGS. Next time it will happen… oh, ok… we shall just wait and hope Mario Draghi says true to his Italian roots long enough for the miracle to happen.

1/8/15: Irish 1Q 2015 Growth: Recovery on Pre-Crisis Peak

In previous posts, I have looked at:

Sectoral growth contributions for 1Q 2015;
Trends in annual (y/y) growth rates in GDP and GNP;
Quarterly (q/q) growth rates; and
Domestic Demand component of GDP.

So now, let's try to answer that persistent question: has Irish Economy regained pre-crisis peaks of economic activity?

To do so, we need two things:

We need 12-months running sum of total activity measured by GDP (mythical metric for Ireland), GNP (increasingly also mythical metric, but slightly better than GDP); and Final Domestic Demand (basically an approximation for the real, domestic economy); and
We need population figures to get the per-capita basis for the above metrics.

We can compute all metrics in (1) based on actual CSO data. But we cannot know exactly our population size (CSO only provides estimates from 2011 through 2014 and no estimates for 2015). So I did a slightly cheeky approximation: I assumed that 2015 will see increase in Irish population of similar percentage as 2014. This is cheeky for two reasons: (1) population change can be slightly more or less than in 2014 due to natural reasons; and (2) emigration might be different in 2015 compared to 2014. Specifically, on the second matter, there has been some evidence of slower emigration out of Ireland and there have been some migrants coming into Ireland on foot of MNCs hiring.

Still, this is as good as things get, so here are the numbers, all referencing inflation-adjusted (real) variables:

Irish Personal Consumption per capita (not shown in the chart above) on 12 months total through 1Q 2015 stood at around EUR19,074.79 or 8.4% lower than pre-crisis peak in 4Q 2007. Meanwhile, Final Domestic Demand per capita was some 15.43% below pre-crisis average. Irish GDP per capita was around 2.4% lower than at pre-crisis peak. However, Irish GNP per capita in 1Q 2015 based on 12 months total was 0.2% above pre-crisis peak.

So in simple terms, by one metric of three, we are back at pre-crisis peak levels in per capita, inflation-adjusted terms. This metric is somewhat better than GDP per capita, but not perfect by any means and is getting worse, not better, in terms of measuring the real activity on the ground. Still, after 8 years, the recession cycle is complete in terms of GNP. It is still ongoing in terms of Domestic Demand.

1/8/15: Irish 1Q 2015 Growth: The Real Economy Side

Having previously looked at

now, let's take a peek at the Domestic Demand component of GDP - the bit that covers Private Consumption, Government Current Expenditures and Gross Fixed Capital Formation.

Looking at real data, not seasonally adjusted:

Personal Expenditure on Goods and Services by Irish households posted 3.78% growth year-on-year in 1Q 2015. This is faster than 4Q 2014 growth of 3.00% and faster than 1Q 2014 y/y growth of 1.56%. The rate of growth is also faster than four-quarters' average of 2.54%. So this is good news. In fact, this is the fastest rate of growth in Personal Expenditure since Q1 2008 and fifth consecutive quarter of y/y growth.

Net Expenditure by Central and Local Government on Current Goods and Services was up 5.91% y/y in 1Q 2015, which is slower than 9.54% y/y growth reordered in 4Q 2014, but faster than 1.46% growth in 1Q 2014. Current rate of growth in Government spending is slightly ahead of the four quarters average of 5.65%.

This is the second fastest rate of Government spending growth since 2Q 2007 and marks 8th consecutive quarter of positive growth in spending, full three quarters longer positive run than for Personal Expenditure. To compare the two series: austerity from 1Q 2013 on implies a rise in Government current (ex-investment) spending of 7.5%, while recovery in the economy means Personal Consumption rising by 5.4% over the same period.

Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation (aka a proxy for Investment - proxy because it includes questionable stuff, like aircraft, as well as some of the MNCs-valued investments) was up 4.03% y/y in 1Q 2015 which is miles lower than 20.3% growth registered in 4Q 2014 when scores of punters rushed out to buy property, and when REITs continued to replace vultures in doing the same. Over the last 4 quarters, average rate of growth in Fixed Capital Formation was 12.77% and even back in 1Q 2014 this activity expanded by 10%, so 1Q 2015 was a major slowdown in activity, albeit it remained positive. This might be a healthy sign of structural normalisation in what has been becoming a somewhat overhyped property market, but it can also be a short-term blip. Overall, 1Q 2015 was the slowest y/y growth quarter since the onset of the 'recovery' in the investment markets here in 3Q 2013 and the first quarter in the period when growth rates fell below 10% mark (albeit 1Q 2014 actual expansion was 9.979%).

With the above, Final Domestic Demand (probably the closest we have in the National Accounts to a realist measure of our economic performance) posted a healthy y/y expansion:

As the above chart shows, Final Domestic Demand rose 4.22% y/y in 1Q 2015, slower than 7.51% growth recorded in 4Q 2014 but faster than 3.61% growth in 1Q 2014. Over the last 12 months, average annual rate of growth in the Domestic Demand was 5.31% which makes 1Q 2015 performance relatively less spectacular. Still, 4.22% growth rate is a healthy one.

And it is consistent with the longer term trends:

As chart above shows, upturn in the Final Domestic Demand took place (on trend) around 3Q 2013 and it is gaining some momentum. However, unlike the GDP series - posting full recovery (on rolling 12mo basis) to pre-crisis peak back in Q3 2014, Final Domestic Demand (domestic economy proxy) is still 11% below the pre-crisis peak. So while our MNCs-inclusive economic performance has regained pre-crisis peak, our domestic economy remains quite below the pre-crisis levels of activity.

Table below summarises source of growth in real GNP:

As shown above, single largest contributor to growth in GNP in 1Q 2015 (annual rate of growth) was Net Trade Balance (Exports less Imports) growth in which accounted for 33.81% of the total expansion in GNP. Personal Expenditure was the second largest contributor to growth with 28.83% share. Overall, growth in Final Domestic Demand (domestic economy proxy) was responsible for 55.4% of total growth in GNP over 1Q 2015 compared to 1Q 2014. Interestingly, inventories (Value of Changes in Stocks) accounted for almost 1/5th of total growth in GNP.

1/8/15: Irish 1Q 2015 Growth: The Real Economy Side

Having previously looked at

With the above, Final Domestic Demand (probably the closest we have in the National Accounts to a realist measure of our economic performance) posted a healthy y/y expansion: