Category Archives: households

15/12/20: Impact of Covid19 on families & labor

 

Some interesting research on the less tangible differential impacts of Covid19 pandemic via McKinsey: families with children and families without children


In all categories, impact of the pandemic has been more severe on families with children. Predictably, as parents are facing increased demand on household work and higher pressure of increased density of living.

Closure of schools or flex-model (partial closure) are probably one of the key drivers:


Public safety during the pandemic might (rightly) be the overriding concern when it comes to designing strategic approach to managing the pandemic responses, but as the pandemic drags on, the above impacts are likely to cumulate. Something has to give. One example of appropriate response should be changing or suspending all traditional job performance assessment metrics, and doing so formally. Another point is that allowing increased mobility for smaller families, while keeping restrictions for larger families - an approach that is consistent with the argument that public health restrictions should be applied predominantly to families with greater vulnerabilities (e.g. families with children) is likely to widen the gap between the Covid19 impacts on families with kids and those without. A third point is that public supports should be extended and increased for families with children. 

These points might appear to be obvious in light of the above evidence, but they are by no means a norm in the public policies deployed in many places. 

In some areas, it is harder to design specific policy responses that can target the prevalence of the more severe impacts. For example, McKinsey reference a substantial gender gap in severity of the aforementioned effects: "Our survey data also show that more mothers struggle with household responsibilities and mental-health concerns compared with fathers (at 73 percent versus 65 percent, and 75 percent versus 69 percent, respectively, citing these challenges as either acute or moderate)." However, as McKinsey research shows, there are some responses that employers have been taking to try and mitigate overall negative impact of Covid19 pandemic on social and physical well-being:


The problem is that (1) the above measures are clearly not enough, and (2) the above measures are not targeted specifically to help families with children. Nor do all of these measures apply to all types of employees. In fact, the more vulnerable employees (termed contracts, contingent workforce, etc) are clearly put at a greater disadvantage by many of these measures. At least four of the ten measures listed in the chart above are clearly associated with increased risk of lower earnings and greater sense of precariousness in one's employment/career prospects. Something that is counter-productive in the pandemic over the long run, even if it appears to be accommodative in the short term. 

The implementation and effectiveness of the above measures are also wanting. Furthermore, the above responses tend to apply across the entire workforce, and do not reflect the fact that pressures of the pandemic are distributed disproportionately across different demographics (I mention families with children and women, but the same concern applies to POC households, LGBTQ+ households and so on):


Something has to give. And the public policy responses should lead, not lag, these developments.


Note: McKinsey's full research paper is available here: https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/diversity-and-inclusion/diverse-employees-are-struggling-the-most-during-covid-19-heres-how-companies-can-respond. 

8/8/17: Did Irish Household Spending Fully Recover from the Crisis?


I have recently seen several research notes claiming that in 1Q 2017, Ireland has finally fully recovered from the shock of the Great Recession. These claims were based on consumer demand regaining its pre-crisis peak.

What do the facts tell us about this claim? That it is a half-truth.

Consider the following chart plotting consumer demand (consumer expenditure on goods and services) computed on an aggregate 4 quarters running basis. I use official CSO data for both expenditure figures and population figures. And I compute per-capita expenditure on the basis of these statistics.


In 1Q 2017, aggregate household expenditure on goods and services stood at EUR96.16 billion against pre-crisis peak of EUR94.118, using constant prices to account for official inflation. Incidentally, there is nothing new in the claim of recovery on that basis, because Irish households' aggregate spending on goods and services has surpassed pre-crisis peak in 2Q 2016.

The problem with the aggregate expenditure figure is that population changes. So the chart above also shows per-capita real expenditure, expressed in 1,000s of constant euros. Here, the matters are a bit less impressive. Per capita household expenditure on goods and services in Ireland peaked pre-crisis at EUR21,508.75. At the end of 1Q 2017, this figure was EUR 20,574.71.

There is another problem with analysts' celebrations of the 'end of the lost decade'. Aggregate household expenditure peaked (pre-crisis) in 1Q 2008, so it took 32 quarters to recover that peak. Per-capita household expenditure peaked in 2Q 2008, which means we are 35 quarters into the crisis and counting. Neither comes up to a full decade.

Finally, there is a really big problem. This one relates to what a 'recovery from the crisis' really means. In the above, we implicitly assume that a recovery from the crisis is return to pre-crisis peak. But there is a major problem with that, because our current state of life-cycle incomes, savings and debt in part reflect decisions made under the assumptions that operated back in the pre-crisis period. In other words, our income, savings, investment, career choice and debt carry a 'memory' of the times when (pre-crisis) trends did not incorporate any expectation of the crisis.

What does this mean? It means that psychologically, materially and even economically, the end of the crisis is when the economy returns to where it should have been were the pre-crisis trend extended into the present. To make this comparative more robust, we should also recognise that, in part, the pre-crisis trend should have omitted at least some of the most egregious excesses of the bubble years.

Let's do that exercise, then. Let's take pre-crisis trend in household expenditure (aggregate and per-capita) for year 3Q 2000-2004 (eliminating the explosive years of 1997-2000 and 2005-2007) and see where we are today, compared to that trend.



On trend, our aggregate personal expenditure should have been around EUR111.7 billion marker in 1Q 2017. It was EUR96.16 billion. This hardly reflects a recovery to the pre-crisis trend.

Also on trend, our per capita expenditure should have been around EUR24,140 in 1Q 2017. It was EUR20,575. This hardly reflects a recovery to the pre-crisis trend.

As some of my friends in Irish stuffbrokerages have been known to remark in private: "Shit! Damn numbers." Indeed... the recovery will have to wait... but, lads, you know you can do these calculations yourselves, right? You are paid six figure salaries and bonuses to do them. Or may be you are not. May be, you are paid six figure salaries and bonuses not to do these calculations...