Category Archives: US-China

18/12/19: Winning Trade [Price] Wars: Updated Data


With the recent announcement of the so-called Phase 1 'Trade Deal' with China, the U.S. President has claimed that his Administration is winning the trade war with Beijing and that the U.S. economy is gaining from the rounds and rounds of tariffs and trade restrictions imposed on its bilateral trade with China.

Here is a tangible set of metrics showing the cost indices for U.S. trade (exports and imports) over the period of President Trump's tenure, compared to the track record of his predecessors:


In basic terms, the adverse movements in imports prices have been more than offset by the positive movements in export prices since the start of the Trump presidency. However, two caveats to this warrant more cautious analysis of this data:

  1. Mr. Trump's presidency has not been associated with statistically distinct imports prices performance, compared to the Obama administration (see averages and levels for import price indices in the above), while Mr. Trump's tenure has been associated with markedly lower export prices for the U.S. exporters (the blue line above); and
  2. The gap between export prices and import prices (positive and larger gap signals higher relative prices of exports compared to imports - a net positive for the external balance), under Trump administration remains well below previous administration's track record (see chart next).

There is preciously little if any evidence in the trade prices indices to suggest that the Trump administration is either winning any trade wars or improving U.S. exporters' environment. If anything, there is more evidence that the U.S. economy is facing similar supportive tailwinds from global imports prices deflation to those experienced by its counterparts, and these are broadly in line with the tailwinds experienced by China:


19/8/19: Import Zamescheniye: Replacing Imports with Imports in the Age of Trade Wars


Trump trade wars have led to increasing evidence of substitution by Chinese exporters to the U.S. with exports via third countries and supply chain outsourcing from China to other destinations. While direct evidence of these trends is yet to be provided (data lags are substantial for detailed flows of goods across borders) and is never to be treated as fully conclusive (due to differences in trade goods designations), here is some macro-level snapshot of latest data on U.S. imports shares for selective countries:

The chart above shows that based on trends, U.S. imports arrivals from China are down in 2017-2019, and they are up, significantly for Vietnam and Taiwan, with less pronounced evidence of imports substitution from other Asia-Pacific countries.

Given several caveats (listed below), the above chart is a 'messy' one:

  1. Supply chain substitution takes time and may not be fully reflected in the 2018 data, or to a lesser extent, in 2019 data to-date; and
  2. The above chart is based on monthly frequency data, which is volatilion (e to begin with.
With these caveats in mind, here is a chart based on annualized data:


Now, it is easier to spot the trends:
  • China exports to the U.S. are down, sharply, especially considering pre-Trade Wars averages against Trade Wars period 2019 averages;
  • Vietnam, Taiwan and Mexico are major channels for trade/import substitution (using Kremlin's term "import zamescheniye").
  • Japan and Thailand are smaller-scale winners.
  • Malaysia and Indonesia are basically static.
Now, historically, China has been beefing up its corporates' use of Vietnam, Thailand, and Mexico as platforms for supply chain diversification, which is consistent with the data responses to the Trade Wars. Indonesia and Malaysia are two surprises in this, although both experienced uptick in FDI from China in late 2018, so the data might not be showing these investments, yet.

15/8/19: Winning Trade Wars: Round 3


A couple of days ago, Germany's info Institute published two scenarios estimating the impacts of the latest President Trump threats to China, the imposition of a 10% tariff on Chinese exports to the U.S.

Per ifo's Scenario 1: "If the US imposed 10 percent tariffs on additional imports worth USD 300 billion, this would mean additional income of EUR 94 million for Germany, EUR 129 million for France, EUR 183 million for Italy, EUR 25 million for Spain, and EUR 86 million for the United Kingdom. It would amount to EUR 1.5 billion for the EU28 and EUR 1.8 billion for the US. China would see losses of EUR 24.8 billion." Note: the U.S. 'gains' do not account for U.S. agricultural subsidies supports increases announced by the Trump Administration, but include estimated consumer impact. Potential depreciation of yuan was also not accounted for in these estimates.

Summarising Scenario 1, ifo noted that "The additional tariffs on US imports from China threatened by US President Donald Trump would negatively impact China, while giving the US, Europe, and the UK moderate advantages."

"However, Chinese retaliatory tariffs could turn the US advantage into a disadvantage, while somewhat reducing China’s losses," ifo notes in relation to the estimates of the impact under Scenario 2 that includes retaliatory tariffs by China. "These retaliatory measures would lead to even greater advantages for the UK and the EU. ...If China imposes a further 10 percent tariff on US imports, it could see its losses fall to EUR 21.6 billion, while turning profits for the US into losses of EUR 1.5 billion. The UK and the EU would have the last laugh and come off best. Germany would see additional income of EUR 323 million, with EUR 168 million for France, EUR 231 million for Italy, EUR 25 million for Spain, and EUR 58 million for the United Kingdom. The EU28 would benefit to the tune of EUR 1.7 billion."


22/7/19: What Import Price Indices Do Not Say About Trump’s Trade War


A few days ago, I saw on Twitter some economics commentators, not quite analysts, presenting the following 'evidence' that Trump tariffs are being paid for by China: the U.S Import Price index has declined in recent months, to below 100. In the view of some commentators, this signifies the fact that the U.S. is now paying less for imports from the ret of the world because Chinese producers are taking a hit on tariffs imposed onto their goods by the Trump Administration and do not pass through these tariffs onto the U.S. consumers.

The argument is a total hogwash. For a number of reasons.

Firstly, as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics notes (see https://www.bls.gov/mxp/ippfaq.htm), import price indices do not incorporate tariffs and duties charged at the border. They actually explicitly exclude these. The indices do not include any taxes, by design.

The indices are quality-balanced, so they are rebalanced to reflect relative quality of goods and commodities supplied. If the U.S. importer gets a better quality (new model, improved model etc) of a good from the exporting country for the same price as the older model, this registers as a decrease in the import price index.

Worse, as BLS notes: "Import/Export Price Indexes cannot be used to measure differences in price levels among different products and services or among different localities of origin. A higher index number for locality A (or product X) does not necessarily mean that prices are higher than for locality B (or product Y) with a lower index number. It only means that prices have risen faster for locality A (or product X) since the reference period."

Note the words: "reference period". Which leads to yet another major problem with the argument that BLS index shows that 'China is absorbing tariffs costs' from the Trump Trade War: it is based on a spot (one point) observation. So let's take a look at the time series. Remember, Trump Trade War started at the very end of 1Q 2018 (March 2018). So here are 'reference period' consistent comparatives for import price indices for a range of regions and countries:


What the chart above tells us is that over the period of the trade war so far, U.S. imports price index indicates some deflation of imports costs, somewhere in the region of 1.13 percentage points. But over the same period of time, China index experienced a decline of 1.36 percentage points. If China is 'paying for U.S. tariffs', the U.S. is paying more than China does, which is of course, entirely possible, but immaterial to the data at hand.

Worse, if declining import price indices are an indicator of a country 'paying for tariffs', well, Canada seems to be paying for most of the Trump Trade War globally, while Japan is paying a little-tiny-bit. Tremendous! Art of the Deal! And all the rest applies.

Of course, what the declines in the vast majority of import price indices suggests is the opposite of the 'China is paying for the U.S. tariffs' story. Instead, they tell us about the inherent weakening in the global demand, the deflationary pressures in key commodities markets (yes, oil, but also soy beans, etc), the deflationary pressures from new technologies and, finally, the changes in currencies valuations.

No, folks, there are no winners in the trade wars, but there are smaller losers and bigger losers. When you impose tariffs on final and intermediate goods, consumers and producers loose. When you impose trade restrictions on imports of basic commodities, without altering global markets supply and demand, you are simply substituting suppliers (see https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2019/05/14519-agent-trumpovich-fails-to-deliver.html).  The latter change might involve some costs, but these costs are much lower than restricting trade in higher value added goods.