Category Archives: Irish tax arbitrage

19/2/20: Facebook becomes another Ireland Inc’s reforms test case


First the 'anti-American'  EU Commission's moved against a wonderful U.S. company washing tens of billions of tax free money through Ireland (see: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-apple-stateaid/apple-says-14-billion-eu-tax-order-defies-reality-and-common-sense-idUSKBN1W1195) and now, the U.S. IRS ('anti-American' as they are) have moved against another wonderful U.S. company washing billions of tax free money through Ireland.

The latest case is, of course, the anti-American IRS suing Facebook over its shenanigans in Ireland: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-tax/facebook-faces-tax-court-trial-over-ireland-offshore-deal-idUSKBN20C2CQ. Per report: "The IRS argues that Facebook understated the value of the intellectual property it sold to an Irish subsidiary in 2010 while building out global operations, a move common among U.S. multinationals."

It is worth noting that this intellectual property redomiciling to Ireland has dramatically increased since the irish Government 'tax reforms' of 2014. Whilst the CSO does not fully account for such transfers in its GNI* measure, the gap between Irish GDP and GNI* has accelerated to historically new levels in recent years, as highlighted here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/02/9220-ireland-more-of-reformed-tax-haven.html.

The case is yet another hammer blow to Ireland's reputation in international economic policy circles and a testament that Ireland's famed compliance with the OECD BEPS rules is a fig leaf of decorum, to be stripped publicly by the EU and the U.S. (and probably other G20) authorities in years to come.

9/1/19: Corporate tax inversions and shareholder wealth


Our new paper "U.S. Tax Inversions and Shareholder Wealth" has been accepted for publication in the International Review of Financial Analysis:


The paper abstract:
"We examine a sample of corporate inversions from 1993-2015 by firms active in the U.S. markets and find that shareholders experience positive abnormal returns in the short-run. In the long-run, inversions have a deleterious effect on shareholder wealth. The form of the inversion and country-pair differences in geographic distance, economic development and corporate governance standards are determinants of shareholder wealth. Furthermore, we find evidence of a negative and non-linear relation between CEO total return and long-run shareholder returns."

9/1/19: Corporate tax inversions and shareholder wealth


Our new paper "U.S. Tax Inversions and Shareholder Wealth" has been accepted for publication in the International Review of Financial Analysis:


The paper abstract:
"We examine a sample of corporate inversions from 1993-2015 by firms active in the U.S. markets and find that shareholders experience positive abnormal returns in the short-run. In the long-run, inversions have a deleterious effect on shareholder wealth. The form of the inversion and country-pair differences in geographic distance, economic development and corporate governance standards are determinants of shareholder wealth. Furthermore, we find evidence of a negative and non-linear relation between CEO total return and long-run shareholder returns."

25/4/17: Couple of Things We Glimpsed from KW Europe ‘Deal’


Yesterday, an interesting bit of newsflow came in from Irish markets-related Kennedy Wilson Europe operations: http://www.independent.ie/business/commercial-property/1bn-worth-of-irish-property-assets-in-kennedy-wilson-discounted-takeover-deal-35650134.html. Setting aside the details of the merger between Kennedy Wilson Inc (U.S. based parent) and Kennedy Wilson Europe (UK and Ireland-based subsidiary), the news have several important disclosures relating to the Irish property markets, Nama and the Irish economy.

Consider the following: 

"Kennedy Wilson Europe Real Estate, which is tax resident in Jersey, pays 25pc tax on taxable profits generated in its Spanish subsidiaries, and it pays income tax at 20pc on rental income derived from its UK investment properties. But the qualifying investor alternative investment funds (QIAIFs) it uses in Ireland to hold its assets were until this year entirely exempt from any Irish taxation on income and gains. The group's total tax bill last year was £7.3m (€8.6m) on profits of £73.3m."

Which implies:
  • Kennedy Wilson's Europe operations are running an effective tax rate of 10 percent. Not 12.5 percent, nor higher. Which shows the extent to which Irish operations tax exempt status drives the overall European tax exposures.
  • Kennedy Wilson's merger across the borders is, it appears, at least in part motivated by changes in the QIAIF regime, imposing new "20pc withholding tax on distributions from Irish property funds to overseas investors".  Bringing the, now more heavily taxed, subsidiary under the KW wing most likely create more efficient tax structure, making Irish taxes paid offsettable against global (U.S. parent) income, without the need to formally remit profits from Europe. Beyond that, the merger will facilitate avoidance of dual taxation (of dividends). Finally, running within a single company entity, KW operations in Europe will also be likely to avail of more tax efficient arrangements relating to transfer pricing.
Another bit worth focusing on: "Kennedy Wilson Europe pointed out in its recently-published annual report that in 2014 it acquired a €202.3m Irish loan book for €75.5m". Yes, that's right, the discount on Irish properties purchased by the KWE was in the range of 62.7 percent, almost double the 33.5 percent average haircut on loans purchased by Nama. Assuming EUR 202.3 million number refers to par value of the assets, this implies that Nama has foregone around EUR59 million, if average discount/haircut was used by Nama in buying these assets in the first place. Look no further than the KW own statement: ""The enterprise will benefit from greater scale and improved liquidity, which will enhance our ability to generate attractive risk-adjusted returns for our shareholders. The merger significantly improves our recurring cash flow profile". The improved cash flow profile is, most likely, at least in part will be attributable tot ax structure changes for the merged entity.

Which is exactly how vulture funds' arithmetic works: pay EUR1.00 to buy an asset that Nama purchased for EUR2.68, which was on the banks' books at EUR 3.58. The asset devalued (on average) to EUR1.43-1.79 in the market at the crisis peak, and the fund is in-the-money on this investment from day one to the tune of at least 43 percent. Without a single brick moved or a single can of paint spent...

Of course, there are other reasons for the deal, including steep discounts on asset valuations in the REITs markets for UK properties, but the potential tax gains are hard to ignore too. Whatever the nature of the deal synergies, one thing is clear - vulture-styled investments work magic for deep pockets investment funds, while traditional small scale investors are forced to absorb losses.



6/11/15: Allergan & Pfizer: More Happiness for OECD Tax Reformists


On foot of couple previous posts relating to Ireland-bound pharma inversions, here is an interesting link to the Bloomberg coverage of the Allergen shenanigans: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-02/a-pharmacist-s-dirty-socks-are-key-to-cutting-pfizer-tax-bill

With a nice chart to accompany:



Couple of links to my previous posts on the topic, covering


“We love your tax compliance theories, OECD!” Signed: Enda.