James Bargent has an interesting post on the future of the FARC for the World Politics Review with Peace Dividend? Postconflict Prospects for the ‘Other’ Colombia.
Colombia’s conflict has always looked different from the vantage point of the jungles, mountains and plains of the country’s most forgotten corners. This is “the other Colombia”: a country of extreme poverty, underdevelopment and state neglect, where Marxist guerrillas have fought the military to a stalemate in over half a century of conflict—and where the peace agreement those rebels are currently negotiating will face its toughest tests.
There’s a lot of different topics in the article, including the potential for the FARC to transition to a political party, possible retaliation against FARC members upon demobilization, economic development of FARC-supportive zones, criminal groups maneuvering to take over FARC illegal revenue streams.
Just briefly thinking about the Central American experience, there needs to be a great deal of trust and patience following a negotiated settlement to the civil war. The FMLN demobilized rather well but didn’t relinquish all its weapons’ caches, one of which embarrassingly blew up in Nicaragua. The US had been pestering the FMLN about surrendering all its weapons, but, of course, they didn’t give them all up. We’re talking the early 1990s when there was not much history of negotiating ends to civil wars.
Some FMLN (and military) engaged in kidnappings and bank robberies during that time. Some demobilized RN traveled Guatemala to join the fight with the URNG. And recruiters went to former conflict zones looking to book veterans (civilian and military) on one way flights to Colombia, Peru and elsewhere. Any one of these “violations” could have thrown a wrench in the peace process.
In Guatemala, ORPA was involved in a dumb kidnapping (the Mincho case) that almost derailed the peace process. Instead, Rodrigo Asturias got to watch the peace celebration from the sidelines. ORPA was allegedly involved in the kidnapping to raise money to support their postwar political activities. While we like to blame ORPA for putting the peace process at risk, it sounds like they were just the ones to get caught.
There are going to be bumps along the road – in terms of implementation and in terms of choices made by people formerly connected to the guerrillas.
How well will the FARC do as a political party? I honestly have no idea although I keep wanting to look into this question. Maybe if the peace process drags on a few more years.
There seems to be genuine support for the FARC across wide-swaths of the country, albeit less populated areas. Combatant-wise, they are down from their highs. They also don’t seem to have as many politically-committed combatants as they used to. The FARC doesn’t appear to have a large network of noncombatant supporters working individually or in mass-based groups. The FARC support is seen more in the countryside rather than urban areas which is not likely to help. Colombia is a large country in terms of territory and population.
The fact that they do not have as many politically-committed combatants and noncombatants as they used to and that their support is almost entirely in the rural areas of Colombia are most likely going to hurt the whatever new political party they forge.
